On the occasion of the November presidential election, the CGAO conducted an in-depth survey on the voting behavior of American Jews, providing valuable insights into their opinions as well as the current and future state of relations between American Jews and the State of Israel, and more broadly, between Israel and the United States.
Massive Pro-Harris Vote, but Slight Decline
Unsurprisingly, American Jews voted overwhelmingly for Kamala Harris in 2024, just as they did for Biden in 2020.
Harris secured 71%-26% of the Jewish vote, compared to Biden’s 77%-21% margin. While a significant exodus did not occur—despite Republican hopes and predictions during an election year marked by the aftermath of the Gaza war and divisions within the Democratic Party—there was indeed some erosion of Jewish support for the Democrats.
However, this erosion must be put into perspective, particularly in light of the Democrats’ national defeat and the Republican Party’s gains among Hispanic and Asian minorities, and to a lesser extent, African Americans.
In fact, American Jews remain the minority most loyal to the Democratic Party, alongside African Americans, continuing an alliance that began under FDR and has demonstrated its strength, particularly during the civil rights movement.
The decline in Jewish support for Democrats can be attributed both to an unfavorable national context for the party and to specific shifts within the American Jewish community.
Shared Trends with Broader American Electorate
American Jews are not isolated from their fellow citizens, and certain trends observed in the overall electorate are also reflected among Jews.
For example, consider the “gender gap”: While Harris won 71%-26% nationally among Jews, she secured 80%-17% among Jewish women and 62%-36% among Jewish men, creating an 18-point gender gap compared to 10 points in the overall American population (Page 29).
Another notable factor is the importance of education as a determinant of voting behavior. Nationally, Harris won 56%-42% among college graduates, while Trump led 56%-43% among non-graduates. This trend is mirrored among Jews: Harris achieved a commanding 77%-20% lead among college-educated Jews, while Trump narrowly won 48%-47% among non-graduates. The strong Democratic vote among Jews can partly be attributed to the high percentage of college graduates within this community—67% of American Jews have a college degree, compared to 38% of the overall American population (Page 85 of the study).
Additionally, one of the most significant aspects of the 2024 election was Trump’s gains among young voters. In 2024, he narrowly lost this group (46%-52%), compared to his decisive loss in 2020 (35%-59% to Biden). This shift is also evident among young American Jews. Among Jews under 35, Harris won 67%-27% compared to Biden’s 78%-22% in 2020 (Page 57 of the study). Among men under 35, Harris’s lead was just 58%-37%, compared to Biden’s 53%-23% margin in 2020 (Page 43), mirroring the broader national trend.
This breakthrough among young Jews offers valuable insights into the current evolution of the American Jewish community.
An Increasingly Religious Jewish Community
According to this study, 9% of American Jews are Orthodox (modern or Haredim), but this figure rises to 15% among those under 35 and 19% among those under 30 (Page 50). It is likely that among the 18–24 age group, this proportion is close to 25%. One of the most predictive factors for voting behavior is the degree of religious practice.
While Harris won 71%-26% overall, her margin was 77%-21% among those who do not attend synagogue and 61%-36% among those who do (see Page 15 of the study).
The increase in Trump’s support among young Jews overall (+5 points between 2020 and 2024) is likely explained by the growing influence of Orthodox Jews in this age group. Indeed, Trump overwhelmingly defeated Harris among Orthodox Jews (86%-12%). By comparison, Harris secured 83%-14% of the vote among liberal Jews (Page 1 of the study).
This trend suggests a significant shift within a generation. While demographics are not destiny, they do offer indications of the direction a society is heading, and Israeli society is a striking example. The proportion of Haredim in Israel has increased substantially in recent years, along with their political influence. Projections estimate that Haredim will constitute 35% of Israel’s Jewish population within 25 years, making one in four Israelis a Haredi.
In the United States, the growing proportion of Haredim and Orthodox Jews will have consequences for voting patterns, at least on a national scale (Haredim have no difficulty voting Democrat in local elections).
At the same time, this probable evolution is accompanied by another movement, this one to the left, among a segment of young, non-Orthodox American Jews.
The Emerging Great Divergence
Turning back to the youth vote: isolating non-Orthodox Jews under 30, their vote shifted from 85–14 in favor of Biden in 2020 to 78–14 for Harris in 2024. While Trump’s share remained steady, the Democratic vote saw a notable drop of 7 points. Among these young non-Orthodox Jews, Jill Stein, known for her pro-Palestinian positions, gained significant traction. This reflects a strong pro-Palestinian leaning among this demographic of young American Jews.
A segment of young American Jews, descendants of traditionally Israel-supportive families who were critical yet attached to Israel, has now become estranged. Their solidarity often extends more naturally toward Palestinians and, among the youngest, even toward Hamas. For some, Zionism has become a distant or alien concept, and their connection to Israel is far from assured.
While 87% of American Jews see opposition to Israel’s right to exist as antisemitic, this figure drops to 75% among those under 35 and 70% for non-Orthodox Jews under 30. It is plausible that this number would be even lower if the survey specifically targeted non-Orthodox Jews under 25. (Page 63)
Indeed, a separate survey commissioned by the Israeli government found that 37% of American Jews aged 14 to 18 expressed sympathy for Hamas, with even higher figures among the 14–15 age group. Additionally, while 78% of American Jews believe campus protests against Israel represent antisemitism, only 62% of those under 35 agree, and just 57% of non-Orthodox Jews under 30 share this view.
A fascinating parallel trend counters the rise in Orthodox religious practice: while 75% of non-Orthodox Jews identify as “Jews by religion,” this drops to 65% among those under 35, with many defining themselves as unaffiliated with religious practice or synagogue membership. (Page 63)
Between the extremes of unaffiliated Jews and Orthodox Jews, the combined proportion represents 40% of American Jews overall but rises to 56% among those under 30, revealing a growing divergence within the community. (Page 50 of the study)
This double movement among young American Jews is striking : secularization and leftward alignment on one side, and a return to religion and rightward alignment on the other, both occurring simultaneously.
Once again, American Jews reflect the broader polarization of American society.
A New American Jewish Perspective
For years, the “mainstream” opinion among American Jews reflected a population that was predominantly Democratic, deeply attached to Israel, and traditionally pro-Israel, yet often at odds with the right-wing Israeli governments and the Haredim, who tended to view American Jews—more liberal both religiously and politically—as not truly Jewish.
It is likely that the very notion of a “mainstream” American Judaism will soon belong to the past, giving way to a more fragmented community divided into three camps:
- A segment that is distant, indifferent, or even hostile toward Israel, representing about 15–20%.
- Another segment, still the majority but in decline, that remains traditionally connected to Israel while willing to criticize its government, accounting for 40–50%.
- A growing segment that supports both Israeli and American right-wing politics, comprising 30–40%.
In this emerging landscape, the relationship with Israel will inevitably evolve. It is also foreseeable that the overwhelming Democratic support among American Jews will diminish, stabilizing around 55–60% rather than the current 70–75%.
Electoral priorities differ significantly based on the affiliations of American Jews. For instance, while 53% of American Jews prioritized the defense of democracy, Israel ranked only fourth, cited by 14% of respondents. However, among Orthodox Jews, Israel was the top electoral consideration for 46%, with only 17% citing the defense of democracy.
This demographic shift and the expected change in the Democratic Party’s stance toward Israel, especially as Israel trends toward an illiberal regime, may erode the Democratic Party’s dominance over the next two decades. These changes will also have significant implications for the Israeli-American relationship.
Towards a New Israeli-American Relationship
Support for Israel remains strongly bipartisan, a critical advantage for the country. This bipartisanship stems from a combination of American Jewish voters, who are loyal but cautious supporters of Israel, and evangelical Christians, Republican voters who back the Israeli right-wing. Despite tensions caused by factors such as settlement expansion and Netanyahu’s alignment with Republicans, which has strained bipartisan support, this broad backing has allowed Israel to secure overwhelming support during the war imposed on it by Hamas following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks.
However, Netanyahu is a highly polarizing figure among American Jews. Only 32% view him favorably. Among Orthodox Jews, his favorability rises to 77%, while it is just 26% among liberal Jews (Page 4). His approval rating is 14% among Democrats but 81% among Republicans (Page 106), reflecting his polarizing nature.
Support for Netanyahu is also a predictive indicator of voting patterns. Among Jews who oppose Netanyahu, Harris won by a margin of 94-4, while among his supporters, Trump prevailed by 68-29 (Page 99 of the study).
Netanyahu’s dominance in Israeli politics over the past 30 years and his role in Israel’s current shift toward greater religious nationalism have likely accelerated the underlying trends discussed here. This evolution may complicate support for Israel in the future, both for the Democratic Party and for a significant segment of American Jews—the “traditionalists”—whose influence is expected to wane.
In this context, the U.S.-Israel relationship is poised to change, not only diplomatically but also on a human level, altering the connection between the world’s largest Jewish diaspora and the Israeli state.
Sebastien Levi
