Drawing by Kichka
In the 1970s, Nahum Goldmann, the former president of the World Jewish Congress, told me that if the vote on the Partition Plan for Palestine—the one that gave the State of Israel its international legitimacy—were to be held again today, it would not end with the same result. Let us recall that for it to be adopted, two-thirds of the countries had to support it, and that it passed by just one vote—33 in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions, and one absent. One hardly dares imagine the outcome of such a vote today!
The recognition of the State of Palestine, now being considered by several Western countries following President Macron’s announcement that France intends to do so at the upcoming UN General Assembly in September—while already 148 of the 194 member states have recognized it—raises a question. Is this meant to repair the historical mistake of not having created an Arab state alongside Israel, as foreseen in the partition plan, rather than to challenge the legitimacy of Israel’s creation, as some voices now openly suggest? The responsibility for that “mistake” rests entirely on the Arab states and Palestinian leaders of the time, who rejected the outcome of that vote. In contrast, the Jewish leadership of the Yishuv—the Jewish community before statehood—accepted it as the culmination of decades of struggle, and of twenty centuries of hope and prayer for the Jewish people to regain their independence.
Nearly 78 years after that vote, is it not time to try to put an end to this conflict and help these two peoples—traumatized by so much suffering and mourning, haunted by fears deeply rooted in their respective histories—set out on a new path? A path that could lead them to the only solution in which each has a place and accepts the other’s presence on this narrow strip of land: two states, side by side. And can recognition of Palestine by Western countries encourage this process?
After 22 months of war and thousands of deaths on both sides, the divide between the two peoples has never been greater, and there is no prospect of dialogue between their current leaders. In Israel, a government led by supremacist ministers continues to push new settlement projects in the occupied territories to make the creation of a future Palestinian state impossible—such as the E1 plan, east of Jerusalem, whose purpose is to split the West Bank in two. Many ministers also now openly advocate for re-establishing settlements in Gaza and pressuring as many Palestinians as possible to “voluntarily” emigrate.
The Palestinian Authority, corrupt and aging, faces internal dissent and survives only thanks to Western support. Weakened though it is, it continues its security cooperation with Israel. Advised by the Élysée, President Mahmoud Abbas has expressed his support for Hamas “laying down arms” and “no longer governing Gaza” as part of an agreement toward statehood. But Hamas is not prepared to comply. Netanyahu maintains that only military pressure will eliminate Hamas and free the hostages. Yet most former security chiefs, including the current IDF Chief of Staff, warn that continuing the war and attempting to reconquer the 25% of territory not yet under Israeli control will take years—two to three, perhaps—and will result in the deaths of the remaining hostages and of many more victims on both sides.
The essential question for Western leaders—long known for their support of Israel since its creation—is therefore how to break the current deadlock and prevent Netanyahu’s government from making the two-state solution impossible. Their bet is to do so by creating new momentum through recognition of the State of Palestine.
First, it would send a powerful message to the Palestinian population, especially its youth: that their national identity is recognized and that much of the international community supports their eventual independence. By offering them a political horizon, it would weaken the extremists whose October 7 attack brought about so much destruction and suffering for the people of Gaza. Moreover, recognition of statehood, with all its symbolic attributes, would strengthen the Palestinians’ position in future negotiations with Israel—negotiations that would then take place between two states.
Such recognition should, as a first step, help bring about a ceasefire in Gaza, as hundreds of thousands of Israelis are demanding in demonstrations. This would allow for the release of all hostages, expansion of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, and the removal of Hamas from governance of the territory. Next should come international reconstruction efforts in Gaza, with significant help from Arab countries in the region.
This recognition by France and other Western nations faces two main objections within Jewish communities in the diaspora and in Israel—even among those who believe in the necessity and inevitability of a two-state solution. These must be addressed.
The first objection is that recognition would reward Hamas, which was responsible for the massacres of October 7, the taking of nearly 250 hostages, and the war that followed. It is true that the October 7 attack brought the conflict back to the forefront of international concern. But that argument would only hold if Hamas’s goal were the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. It never has been. Hamas is not driven by nationalist ideology but by religious conviction, in which there is no place for a Jewish state within the Ummah—the worldwide Muslim community. For Hamas, the creation of a Palestinian state on part of Palestine would be the worst outcome, as it could undermine the very conditions that sustain its power and influence over parts of the Arab population.
The second objection comes from some Israeli political leaders opposed to the occupation and supportive of the two-state solution. Confronted with an Israeli population still traumatized by the October 7 massacres, they are keenly aware that any solution must first guarantee a return to security, the sidelining of Hamas, and the establishment of moderate governance in the future Palestinian state. For this reason, perceiving Macron’s initiative as unilateral—as it is often portrayed in Israeli media—they oppose it, seeing no guarantees for Israel’s security. That is why it is absolutely essential that recognition by France and other Western nations come with clear conditions for the Palestinians: the future state must be demilitarized; its borders must be negotiated with Israel on the basis of the 1967 lines; and Hamas must be excluded from its governance. Only under these conditions can Israelis be convinced that their security will not be jeopardized.
Such recognition should not weaken the Israeli left but, on the contrary, give it an opportunity to show the Israeli public that Israel’s friends stand beside it to end the current deadlock, bring about the end of the war and the release of the hostages, and restart negotiations that must ultimately lead to the two-state solution.
Only the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel can definitively cement Israel’s international legitimacy—legitimacy originally secured in 1947 through an extraordinary historical convergence of circumstances—by ensuring recognition from those Arab countries that still withhold it, thus guaranteeing Israel’s integration into the Middle East.
David Chemla
